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Executive Summary
In this article, we define good scholarship, highlight our points of disagreement with
Locke and Latham (2009), and call for further academic research to examine the full range of
goal setting’s effects. We reiterate our original claim that goal setting, like a potent medication,
can produce both beneficial effects and systematic, negative outcomes (Ordóñez, Schweitzer,
Galinsky, & Bazerman, 2009), and as a result, it should be carefully prescribed and closely
monitored.

In 1999, the FDA approved Merck’s arthritis drug Vioxx. Through clinical drug trials,
Vioxx had been subjected to rigorous tests and careful research. Soon after approval, however,
Merck began to receive anecdotal evidence about patients who suffered heart attacks while
taking the drug. Of course, many people suffer from cardiovascular disease and heart attacks are
multiply determined. How then, should executives at Merck respond? Since Vioxx had already
been subjected to rigorous testing, should the “anecdotal evidence” be dismissed? Or, should
Merck conduct additional research exploring the possible link between Vioxx and heart disease?
And, even before there is definitive proof linking Vioxx and heart disease, is it reasonable for
doctors to become more wary of prescribing the drug?
Locke and Latham (2009) deem anecdotes unworthy of academic attention. Further,
Locke and Latham (2009) argue that as long as the benefits of a strategy are causally determined,
while the negative effects have been shown in only a few causal studies along with many
anecdotal accounts, we should dismiss the negative findings.
We profoundly disagree. We think that qualitative analyses, case studies, journalistic
accounts, and anecdotes should all be used to raise questions, focus attention, and develop ideas
that should be subjected to rigorous, causal analyses.
We believe that our disagreements with Locke and Latham highlight not only our
differences about goal setting, but also about what constitutes good scholarship. In this response
to Locke and Latham (2009), we articulate the aims of our first article (Ordóñez, Schweitzer,
Galinsky, & Bazerman, 2009), describe points of disagreement with Locke and Latham (2009),
offer a definition of good scholarship, and suggest a program of research for future goal setting
studies.
Our Objectives
We wrote our initial article (Ordóñez et al., 2009) within the context of the existing goal
setting literature and the ubiquitous use of goals in managerial practice. We did not aspire to
review—yet again—the goal setting literature. Instead, our aim was to raise questions, suggest
caution, and issue a call for future research. To convey our message, we invoke a metaphor: goal
setting as a prescription strength medication that has both powerful positive effects and
formidable negative side-effects.
Although most goal setting studies have documented beneficial effects, we believe that
anecdotes and empirical results linking goals with harmful outcomes deserve much more
attention and more systematic research. Given that one large negative effect can overwhelm the
influence of many positive effects, our aim was simply to state that the possibility of systematic
harm resulting from goal setting merits far greater academic scrutiny and managerial attention.
Points of Disagreement with Locke and Latham (2009)

Anecdotal evidence. Locke and Latham (2009) dismiss our concerns about goal setting
by conveying the impression that the foundation for our thesis rests almost entirely on a few
anecdotes. Locke and Latham (2009) seek to persuade the reader on this point through shear
repetition: “largely anecdotes,” “treating anecdotes as evidence,” “reporting selected ‘war
stories’.” Locke and Latham (2009) claim that we believe “research is to be ignored and news
reports are to be embraced,” and that “it is incomprehensible that scholars, rather than subject
their speculation to programmatic research, would simply rely on stories in news periodicals.”
In response, we offer three replies. First, Locke and Latham's (2009) characterization of
our view of scholarship: “research is to be ignored and news reports are to be embraced,” is
simply wrong. There is mounting causal evidence linking goal setting with a range of behaviors
including a shift in risk taking (Larrick, Heath, & Wu, in press), greater unethical behavior
(Schweitzer, Ordóñez, & Douma, 2004), and a narrow focus that draws attention from other
important elements of the problem (Staw & Boettger, 1990). Ordóñez et al. (2009) cite these and
other empirically-based articles that demonstrate a causal link between goal setting and harmful
behavior.
Second, we continue to believe that anecdotes, case studies, and journalistic accounts can
inform important research questions. Do anecdotes prove causality? Of course not. Can
anecdotes help spotlight issues that merit caution and further investigation? Absolutely. Both in
our initial article and here we explicitly call for further research.
Third, what should we do as the anecdotal evidence continues to mount? For example,
consider General Motors’ use of goal setting in 2002. At that time, GM had 28.2% of the car and
light truck market in the United States. GM executives set a specific, stretch goal of capturing
29% of the market. To gain commitment to this goal, G.M. executives wore pins with the
numeral ''29'' (Maynard, 2002). In an effort to reach this goal, GM expanded its offering of
interest free loans and “no money down” incentives. As GM lost money on a per unit basis, few
executives stopped to focus on the implications of this narrow goal. “Fixated on this target, the
firm went on to make decision after disastrous decision that helped drag it to the brink of
bankruptcy” (“The perils of goal-setting,” 2009). GM may never achieve their goal of 29%
market share, but in pursuit of this specific, stretch goal, GM executives damaged the
profitability of a once great company.
Or, consider HUD’s low-income lending goals for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. These
specific, stretch goals significantly expanded in 2001-2003 (e.g., a goal of at least 20 percent of
mortgage purchases dedicated for low- or very low-income families in low-income areas,
compared to a corresponding goal of 14 percent in 1997-2000), pushing Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac to make many risky and unprofitable loans. Since the collapse of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac in 2008, it is clear that these stretch goals at Fannie and Freddie have had huge implications
for American tax payers.

Are these stories of GM and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac anecdotes? Yes. Should these
accounts cause us to think more carefully about how we set and use goals? Yes. And, do we still
need more research on goal setting? Absolutely!
Minimizing the problem. In reference to Schweitzer et al. (2004) documenting a causal
relationship between goals setting and cheating, Locke and Latham (2009) respond “fair enough,
but is this a typical finding?” It is not a typical finding, but this is our point. If further work
examined goal setting under conditions that permitted cheating, we postulate that findings
linking goals with cheating might be far more typical than Locke and Latham suppose.
Ultimately, this is an empirical question, and we call on scholars studying goal setting to design
studies that allow for and measure a wide range of goal setting effects (including intrinsic
motivation, cheating, and risk tolerance).
New evidence. Locke and Latham (2009) criticize our Academy of Management
Perspectives article for not reporting results from new studies. Though it should be apparent to
any reader of the Academy of Management Perspectives, our aim was not to report new studies.
Consistent with the journal’s objectives (from the AMP website), we aimed to “make
information about empirical research in management accessible to the non-expert.” Suggesting
that our article somehow fell short for failing to report new data misrepresents the mission of the
journal.
Originality. After thoroughly criticizing our conclusions, Locke and Latham then support
the very claims we propose by stating that they “were among the first to alert practitioners to the
possible dangers of setting goals.” We agree and cited them in our original paper. However, their
prior work falls short. They offer an incomplete account of the hazards of setting goals and
convey the impression that these problems are minor, and unworthy of significant concern and
future research.
In contrast, we postulate that goal setting may cause deep, systematic problems far more
serious than prior work suggests. We postulate that the mild “solutions” Locke and Latham
propose, most of them untested, may fail to solve these problems. In addition, the goal setting
“pitfalls” Locke and Latham identify have generated surprisingly little research attention from
leading goal setting scholars. Thus, we continue to call for more research that allows equal
measurement of the potential negative side effects.
Out of context. When should goals be used? After accusing us of selectively citing
sources, Locke and Latham (2009) quote us out of context. They suggest that we propose that
“goals should be used only in the narrowest of circumstances.” Though this might possibly be
true, what we actually stated was the following:
In particular, we encourage managers to ask themselves the questions listed in
Table 1 when considering the use of goals. This cautious approach to setting

goals is consistent with King and Burton’s (2003) claim that goals should be used
only in the narrowest of circumstances.
Until further research is conducted, we are not able to articulate when goal setting should
be implemented, when it should be abandoned, and under which conditions goal setting can
achieve its aims with as few side-effects as possible.
Good Scholarship
Defining Scholarship. Although good scholarship can take many forms, a necessary
condition for good scholarship is asking interesting questions which address important issues
and/or challenge existing beliefs.
A second component of good scholarship is generating new knowledge. New knowledge
changes the way individuals think about a problem or solve a vexing conundrum. New
knowledge often emerges not from an individual study but across studies, across researchers, and
across methodologies. Sometimes it emerges through theoretical analysis and other times
through empirical research. There are many approaches to generating new knowledge, and
different approaches offer trade-offs. For example, laboratory research may establish internal
validity at the expense of external validity.
A third component of good scholarship, especially in the social sciences, is sound
empirics. Whether scholars measure or manipulate constructs, it is important that these
constructs accurately reflect underlying conceptual variables. Careful scholarship establishes
causal relationships by disentangling confounds, ruling-out competing explanations, and
maintaining internal consistency.
A fourth component of good scholarship is generating implications. Good scholarship has
implications for theory, practice, or both.
Finally, good scholarship is broadly disseminated and widely consumed. Most typically,
scholars convey new ideas through effective writing and speaking in prominent forums and
outlets.
Producing Good Scholarship. Good scholarship is the product of healthy academic
environments, ones in which curious scholars with open minds and different perspectives are
encouraged to vet ideas. Ultimately, this vetting process will produce new knowledge.
Within our institutions, we have an obligation to create communities committed to openminded debate. In many cases, good scholarship will require academics to raise difficult
questions about favored theories. When this happens, it is important to avoid ad hominem
attacks. More specifically, senior colleagues should not only advocate for the use of
“dispassionate language”( Locke & Latham, 2009), but actually use this language themselves.
This would require scholars to curtail their use of disparaging accusations such as “egregious

scholarship,” “poor scholarship”, “irresponsible”, “unscholarly attacks”, and sentences such as,
“Ordóñez et al. (2009) would do well to abandon their roles as reporters with an axe to grind and
embrace good scholarship.”
When Locke and Latham accuse scholars who raise legitimate concerns about their
favorite theory of having “breached the principles of good scholarship” they cause harm to the
“dispassionate” approach to research they purportedly endorse and to good scholarship more
generally.
Future Research Directions
We see our lively debate in the Academy of Management Perspectives as an open call for
a more systematic investigation of the negative effects of goals that can lead to systematic
problems in organizations. Thus, we reiterate our call for a program of research to investigate
how “goals go wild.” We hope that this program of research will be conducted by independent
researchers from many institutions on many continents. This research should take multiple
forms, both in and outside the lab, and should cover a range of potential outcomes.
Three areas with significant prospects for illuminating potential problems are the links
between goal setting and unethical behavior, goal setting and excessive risk-taking, and goal
setting and judgment. As financial crises, Ponzi schemes, and the collapse of the automotive
industry demonstrate, the combination of unethical behavior, risk-taking and poor judgment can
be toxic. We are not implying that goal setting was the primary cause of the current crises.
Instead, we suggest that we should develop and sharpen our understanding of those contextual
factors that produce harmful behaviors. We believe that goal setting research can develop our
understanding of how some harmful behaviors systematically occur.
Although empirical evidence has started to accumulate linking goals with negative
outcomes, we now need to develop theoretical frameworks that can simultaneously explain both
the positive and the negative outcomes of goals. One good example of this type of research is the
theoretical framework developed by Barsky (2008). This framework details the cognitive and
motivational mechanisms of goal setting. Drawing on previous research (Schweitzer et al.,
2004), Barsky (2008) develops a theoretical foundation in which goals hinder ethical recognition
and promote moral disengagement, leading to unethical behavior.
In addition, Heath, Larrick, and Wu (1999) developed a model of goal setting which
equates goals with reference points, evoking Prospect Theory as a foundation (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979). This “goals as reference points” model explains previous goal setting results
while also predicting new findings such as goal-induced risk taking (Larrick et al., in press).
Many other questions remain to be addressed. For example, how are goals set in
competitive environments? Do executives in organizations in extremely competitive
environments set different goals than do executives in less competitive environments? How do

individuals in organizations manipulate the process of setting goals for their own personal
benefit? Under what conditions are individuals likely to set the wrong type of goals (e.g.,
quantity rather than quality, revenue rather than profit)?
One particularly pressing issue is the interplay between culture and goal setting. We think
there may be a reciprocal interplay between goal setting and organizational context. Not only is
organizational culture likely to influence goal setting (as Locke & Latham, 2009 suggest), but the
use of goal setting is also likely to influence organizational culture. For example, when
executives employ “management by objectives” they communicate an important message about
the relative importance they place on process and outcomes.
There is fertile ground to continue investigating the boundary conditions of goal setting,
especially situations in which goals are applied in the larger context of an organization. As both
Locke and Latham (2009) and we point out, focusing on specific goals narrows our focus and
can lead to unintended but predictable consequences. Further research in this area may help us
determine warning signals or pinpoint the problematic conditions under which goals focus our
attention too narrowly, with too much risk and without ethical constraints.
Although all four of us are primarily laboratory experimentalists, we believe that the
method must match the research problem, and that we should always be aware of the limits and
biases of our methods. The laboratory allows us to identify new effects and to prove their causal
pattern. But, laboratories are weak instruments for measuring the strengths of effects in real
contexts, especially when the context itself (e.g., organizational culture) is of interest, since
experimentalists have so much control over the strengths of the manipulations.
Good scholarship requires that we see the barriers to discovery created by our preferred
methods. In the common structure of laboratory goal setting research, the possibility of ignoring
non-measured outcomes, taking unhealthy risks, and engaging in unethical behavior have
typically been eliminated as concerns by the nature of the experimental task.
Ordóñez et al. (2009) call for future research to investigate both the constructive and the
harmful effects of goals. This will require new and creative approaches, so that variables not
explored in the mainstream goal setting area can emerge and be better understood.
Conclusion
Soon after Merck launched Vioxx, it became a commercial success. Though a few
stories, and some experimental evidence, linked Vioxx with heart attacks, executives at Merck
dismissed these “anecdotes” and continued to promote Vioxx. Over the next five years,
pharmacists in the U.S. would fill over 80 million Vioxx prescriptions. It was only in 2004, after
the evidence became incontrovertible that Merck withdrew Vioxx from the market.

Goal setting, of course, is not Vioxx. As scholars, however, we can use this analogy to
appreciate the dilemma that Merck’s executives faced. When confronted by anecdotal evidence
and some causal evidence, how should one react?
Setting a model for the dispassionate dialogue Locke and Latham (2009) purport to
support, they ask “Falsehoods and insults aside, are Ordóñez et al. (2009) implying that more
knowledge about goals is yet to be discovered?” You bet we do!
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